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Abstract— Shill bidding is where spurious bids are intro-
duced into an auction to drive up the final price for the
seller, thereby defrauding legitimate bidders. Trevathan and
Read presented an algorithm to detect the presence of shill
bidding in online auctions. The algorithm observes bidding
patterns over a series of auctions, and gives each bidder a
shill score to indicate the likelihood that they are engaging
in shill behaviour. While the algorithm is able to accurately
identify those with suspicious behaviour, it is designed for
the instance where there is only one shill bidder. However,
there are situations where there may be two or more shill
bidders working in collusion with each other. Colluding shill
bidders are able to engage in more sophisticated strategies
that are harder to detect. This paper proposes a method
for detecting colluding shill bidders, which is referred to
as the collusion score. The collusion score, either detects a
colluding group, or forces the colluders to act individually
like a single shill, in which case they are detected by the
shill score algorithm. The collusion score has been tested on
simulated auction data and is able to successfully identify
colluding shill bidders.
Index Terms— Auction fraud, shill bidding, reputation sys-
tem, colluding bidders, bidding agents, graph theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Online auctions are a popular means to exchange items.
However, to the unsuspecting, the auction process is
fraught with peril. Auction fraud is an ever-increasing
problem that is magnified in the online environment.
For example, a seller might accept payment and not
deliver an item, or misrepresents the item to be of greater
value. Furthermore, auction participants might engage
in practices such as siphoning, sniping, bid rigging or
shilling, that are designed to influence the auction in a
manner that disadvantages others (see [6]).
Shill bidding is the act of introducing fake bids into
an auction on the seller’s behalf, in order to artificially
inflate an item’s price. Bidders who engage in shilling
are referred to as ‘shills’. To win the item, a legitimate
bidder must outbid a shill’s price. If one of the shills
accidentally wins, then the item is re-sold in a subsequent
auction. Shill bidding is a problem as it forces legitimate
bidders to pay significantly more.
The advent of online auctions such as eBay 1 and
ubid 2 have made shill bidding much easier. This is due
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to bidders not being physically present, which allows
a shill to anonymously influence the bidding process.
Furthermore, it is relatively simple for a seller to register
under many aliases, and operate in rings with impunity.
For example, in March 2001, a U.S. federal grand jury
charged three men for their participation in a ring of
fraudulent bidding in hundreds of art auctions on eBay
(see Schwartz and Dobrzynski [3]). The men created
more than 40 User IDs on eBay using false registration
information.
Trevathan and Read [8] presented an algorithm (re-
ferred to as the Shill Score or SS algorithm) to detect
the presence of shill bidding in online English auctions.
The algorithm observes bidding patterns over a series of
auctions, and gives each bidder a shill score to indicate
the likelihood that they are engaging in shill behaviour.
The algorithm is able to accurately identify those with
suspicious behaviour in the case where there is only one
shill bidder. However, as the example above illustrates,
there are situations where multiple shills are in collusion
with each other.
Collusive shill bidding refers to the instance where two
or more shills work together. Collusion makes it more
difficult to determine whether shilling is occurring in an
auction, and which bidders are responsible for the shill
bids. This is because colluding shills can distribute the
work evenly among each other to collectively reduce their
shill scores. For example, a group of shills can take turns
at submitting bids, and/or alternate at participating in an
auction. This has the effect of making an individual shill
appear to be a regular bidder.
This paper proposes methods for detecting colluding
shill bidders (extending upon our previous work [9]). Sev-
eral collusion ratings are presented that indicate whether
collusion is occurring, and which bidders are most likely
to be in collusion with each other. The collusion ratings
look for typical collusive behaviour among bidders, and
form a bidder’s collusion score. The group of shills
is faced with a choice of either, a) acting as a group
and being detected by the collusion score, or b) acting
individually (like a single shill), and being detected by
the SS algorithm. The collusion score has been tested
on simulated auction data to gauge its effectiveness in
detecting colluding shills.
This paper is organised as follows: Background on
general shill behaviour is discussed in Section II. Sec-
tion III describes shill detection methods and provides an
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overview of the SS algorithm. Section IV extends the SS
algorithm to detect collusive shill behaviour, and identify
which bidders are in collusion with each other. Section V
describes how the proposed collusion score performs on
simulated auction data with colluding shills. Section VI
provides concluding remarks.
II. SHILL BEHAVIOUR
This section provides an insight into general shill
behaviour. It describes a shill’s mindset, characteristics
and strategies, and presents an example of shill behaviour
in an auction. There are other possible behaviours that
can be considered as shilling. Furthermore, there is often
much confusion over what constitutes shill behaviour.
However, we believe that this section outlines the optimal
or ‘best’ strategies for a shill to take in terms of obtaining
the highest shilling profit, whilst avoiding winning an
auction.
A. Shill Mindset
The main goal for shilling is to artificially inflate the
price for the seller beyond what legitimate bidders would
otherwise require to win the item. The pay-off for the
seller is the difference between the final price and the
un-inflated price.
Another of a shill’s main goals is to lose each auction.
A shill is not constrained by a budget, but rather a profit
margin. If the shill wins, the item is resold in a subsequent
auction. However, there is a limit on how many times
this can be done. For each auction won, the seller incurs
auction listing fees and is required to invest more time.
Continual wins erode the profit from shilling on the item.
The shill faces a dilemma for each bid they submit.
Increasing a bid could marginally increase the revenue
for the seller. However, raising the price might also result
in failure if it is not outbid before the auction terminates.
The shill must decide whether to take the deal or attempt
to increase the pay-off.
On the contrary, a bidder’s goal is to win. A bidder
has a finite budget and is after the lowest price possible.
Increasing a bid for a legitimate bidder decreases the
money saved, but increases the likelihood of winning.
B. Shill Characteristics and Strategies
The following outlines typical shill characteristics as-
suming we are using an auction that terminates at a set
expiration time (refer to [6], [8] for a more detailed
explanation):
1) A shill usually bids exclusively in auctions only held
by one particular seller.
2) A shill tends to have a high bid frequency. An
aggressive shill will continually outbid legitimate bids
inflating the final price until the seller’s expected pay-
off for shilling has been reached, or until the shill risks
winning the auction (e.g., near the termination time or
during slow bidding).
3) A shill has few or no winnings.
TABLE I.
AN EXAMPLE AUCTION WITH ONE SHILL
Bid # bid Price Time
15 b1 $ 33 20:03
14 b2 $ 32 12:44
13 b1 $ 31 12:42
12 b2 $ 26 5:05
11 b1 $ 25 5:02
10 b2 $ 21 2:47
9 b3 $ 20 2:45
8 b2 $ 15 1:07
7 b1 $ 14 1:05
6 b2 $ 9 0:47
5 b3 $ 8 0:45
4 b2 $ 6 0:20
3 b3 $ 5 0:19
2 b2 $ 2 0:06
1 b1 $ 1 0:05
4) It is advantageous for a shill to bid within a small
time period after a legitimate bid. Generally a shill wants
to give legitimate bidders as much time as possible to
submit a new bid before the closing time of the auction.
5) A shill usually bids the minimum amount required to
outbid a legitimate bidder. If the shill bids an amount that
is much higher than the current highest bid, it is likely
that legitimate bidders will be deterred from bidding.
6) A shill’s goal is to try and stimulate bidding. As a
result, a shill will tend to bid more near the beginning
of an auction. This means a shill can influence the entire
auction process compared to a subset of it. Furthermore,
bidding towards the end of an auction is risky as the shill
could accidentally win.
We refer to the most extreme shill bidding strategy
as aggressive shilling. An aggressive shill continually
outbids everyone thereby driving up the price as much as
possible. This strategy often results in the shill entering
many bids.
In contrast, a shill might only introduce an initial bid
into an auction where there has been no prior bids with the
intent to stimulate bidding. This behaviour is a common
practice in traditional and online auctions. However, most
people typically do not consider it fraudulent. Neverthe-
less it is still shilling, as it is an attempt to influence
the price by introducing spurious bids. We refer to this as
benign shilling in the sense that the shill does not continue
to further inflate the price throughout the remainder of the
auction. A benign shill will typically make a “one-off” bid
at or near the beginning of the auction.
Regardless of the strategy employed, a shill will still
be a bidder that often trades with a specific seller but has
not won any auctions. A shill’s strategy is also affected
by the value of the current bid in relation to the reserve
price. For example, once bidding has reached the reserve
price it becomes more risky to continue shilling. This is
conditional on whether the reserve is a realistic valuation
of the item that all bidders share.
C. Shill Example
Table I illustrates an example auction with three bid-
ders. Each bidder is denoted as b1, b2 and b3 respectively.
Bidders b1 and b3 are legitimate, whereas b2 is a shill.
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b2 engages in aggressive shill behaviour by outbidding
a legitimate bid by the minimal amount required to stay
ahead and within a small time period of the last bid. b2’s
bids force the other bidders to enter higher bids in order to
win. If b2 was not participating in this auction, b1 would
have only needed to pay $21 in order to win. Instead b2
caused b1 to pay $33, thus the shill has inflated the price
by $12.
In this example, b2 exhibits the typical shill behaviour
described above. This is evidenced by: 1. High frequency
of bids (i.e., b2 has submitted more bids than both the
other bidders); 2. Has not won the auction despite the
high number of bids; 3. Quick to bid after a legitimate
bidder; and 4. Only bids the minimal amount to stay in
front.
III. SHILL DETECTION
Until recently, there was limited coverage on exactly
how to detect shill bidding. A basic attempt was proposed
by Shah et al [4] using data mining techniques. Rubin
et al [2] use three broad metrics for measuring what
they consider ‘shill behaviour’, to construct a reputation
system. Cheng and Xu [1] recently showed how shill bid-
ders can potentially be identified by the manner in which
bidders behave in two concurrently running auctions for
identical items. Trevathan and Read [8] propose a solution
(i.e., the SS algorithm), that observes bidding patterns
over a series of auctions for a particular seller, looking
for the shilling behaviour outlined in Section II. The goal
is to obtain statistics regarding a bidder’s conduct, and
deduce a measure called a shill score, that indicates the
likelihood that s/he is engaging in shill behaviour.
The SS algorithm targets core shilling strategies. A shill
that deviates too far from these characteristics is less ef-
fective, and won’t significantly alter the auction outcome.
This approach acts as both a detection mechanism and a
deterrent to shill bidders. To avoid detection, a shill must
behave like a normal bidder, which essentially stops them
shilling.
The SS algorithm basically works as follows (see
Trevathan and Read [8] for further details): A bidder i,
is examined over m auctions held by the same seller for
the behaviour outlined in Section II. Each characteristic
of shill behaviour is given a rating, which is combined
to form the bidder’s shill score. The shill score gives a
bidder a value between 0 and 10. The closer the shill
score is to 10, the more likely that the bidder is a shill.
The algorithm’s goal is to determine which bidder is most
inclined to be the shill out of a group of n bidders. The
shill behavioural ratings are calculated as follows:
• α Rating - Percentage of auctions (by a particular
seller) bidder i has participated in.
• β Rating - Percentage of bids bidder i has made out
of all the auctions participated in.
• γ Rating - Normalised function based on the auctions
bidder i has won out of the auctions participated in.
• δ Rating - Normalised inter bid time for bidder i out
of the auctions participated in.
• ² Rating - Normalised inter bid increment for bidder
i out of the auctions participated in.
• ζ Rating - Normalised time bidder i commences
bidding in an auction.
Each rating is between 0 and 1, where the higher
the value, the more suspicious the bidder. A bidder’s
shill score (denoted as SS) is calculated as the weighted
average of these ratings:
SS =
ω1α+ ω2β + ω3γ + ω4δ + ω5²+ ω6ζ
ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6
× 10
where ωi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, is the weight associated with each
rating. [8] provides details and justifications for selection
of weight values. If a bidder wins an auction, then his/her
α, β, δ, ² and ζ ratings are 0 for the particular auction (as
winning is inconsistent with a shill’s goals). Note that the
higher each individual rating, the higher the shill score
(γ, δ and ² are inverted).
IV. COLLUDING SHILLS
The SS algorithm considers only the basic scenario
with one shill. In the case outlined in Section I, there were
three sellers which used 40 different aliases (40 shills in
effect). The sellers understood that there was less chance
that they would get caught if they utilised multiple names
to take alternating turns at shilling. This makes it more
difficult for authorities to determine which bidders are
shills, as collusive behaviour allows shills to appear as
more regular bidders.
In terms of the SS algorithm, introducing multiple shills
makes the task of detection much harder. This is because
colluding shills can engage in more sophisticated strate-
gies in an attempt to thwart the detection algorithm. This
section discusses these strategies and presents methods
by which the SS algorithm can be extended to detect
colluding shills. We restrict our attention to the case
where there is only one seller which controls multiple
shills. That is, we are not investigating strategies involving
multiple sellers.
In some cases, geographical proximity can be an indi-
cation of collusion if there are several shills within a close
area that participate in the auction. For example, in the
shill case, two of the men were from California and the
other was from Colorado. However, this is not a reliable
indicator of shilling and may raise privacy concerns, as
it requires examining the registration database for such
relationships. Checking suspect colluders’ geographical
proximity would generally only occur once the SS-
collusion algorithm has been run, thus ensuring there is
strong evidence for doing so.
As stated previously, the main goal of shilling is to
drive up the price of an item. In the situation where
there is only one shill, the shill’s secondary goal is to
attempt to do this in such a manner that it minimises
his/her shill score. When there is more than one shill,
there are particular strategies that the group (of shills) can
engage in to influence some factors contributing to their
individual shill scores. Therefore the group’s collective
JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 2, NO. 10, DECEMBER 2007 65
© 2007 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
TABLE II.
AN EXAMPLE AUCTION WITH TWO SHILLS ALTERNATING BIDS
Bid # bid Price Time
1 b1 1 0:05
2 b2 2 0:06
3 b1 5 0:19
4 b3 6 0:20
5 b1 8 0:45
6 b2 9 0:47
7 b1 14 1:05
8 b3 15 1:07
9 b1 20 2:45
10 b2 21 2:47
11 b1 25 5:02
12 b3 26 5:05
13 b1 31 12:42
14 b2 32 12:44
15 b1 35 20:03
goal (secondary to shilling) is to minimise its member’s
shill scores.
Despite being able to use more complicated strategies,
the group as a whole must still conform to certain
behaviour in order to be effective as a shill. With regard
to the SS algorithm, all that shills can do by colluding is
to reduce their α, β and ζ ratings. The γ, δ and ² ratings
are still indicative of shill bidding. For example, none of
the colluding shills will ever win an auction. Furthermore,
it is still in the group’s interests to bid quickly, and by
minimal amounts to influence the selling price. Therefore,
inter bid times and increments will be consistent for shills.
There appear to be three possible strategies that can
be employed by colluding shills. The following example
illustrates the first strategy. Here there are two colluding
shills (s1 and s2). Each shill takes alternating turns at
bidding, i.e., si bids, then s2 bids, then s1 bids again,
etc. This behaviour is shown in Table II. Here there are
three bidders denoted b1, b2 and b3 respectively. b1 is a
legitimate bidder, but b2 and b3 are shills. b2 and b3 take
alternating turns at outbidding b1.
This strategy has the effect of lowering b2 and b3’s
β ratings (i.e., the number of individual shill bids in an
auction). We refer to this strategy as the alternating bid
strategy.
The second strategy is for colluding shills to take turns
at shilling for a particular auction. For example, given
two auctions, one shill will bid exclusively in the first
auction, while the other shill bids only in the second
auction. This strategy lowers the shills’ α ratings (i.e.,
number of auctions participated in), but does not affect
their β ratings. We refer to this strategy as the alternating
auction strategy.
The third strategy is to use a combination of the
alternating bid and alternating auction strategies. This can
be used to alter the group’s α and β ratings between
the two extremes. We refer to this strategy as the hybrid
strategy. An example of a hybrid strategy would be for
shills s1 and s2 to alternately bid in auction1, s3 and s4
alternately bid in auction2, then s1 and s3 alternately bid
in auction3, etc. This continues until all combinations of
bidders have been used, and then the process repeats. In
reality, colluding shills would probably employ a hybrid
strategy.
TABLE III.
AUCTION WITH TWO BIDDERS - ONE BIDDER (b1), ONE SHILL (s1)
nj b1 s1 bid sequence b1 s1
3 2 1 b1, s1, b1 dnj/2e bnj/2c
4 2 2 s1, b1, s1, b1 nj/2 nj/2
5 3 2 b1, s1, b1, s1, b1 dnj/2e bnj/2c
6 3 3 s1, b1, s1, b1, s1, b1 nj/2 nj/2
The following notation is used throughout this paper:
Let L = {1, ..., `} be a set of bidder numbers; |L| = `
Let M = {1, ...,m} be a set of auction numbers; |M | =
m
Let B = {b1, ..., b`} be a set of bidders and S =
{s1, ..., s`′}, S ⊂ B, be the set of shills, where `′ < `.
A. Alternating Bid Strategy
If the alternating bid strategy is employed, it is in the
group’s best interests to evenly alternate. If a particular
shill bids more than other shills, this will increase that
individual’s β rating and hence their shill score. This
violates the group’s collective goal of minimising all its
member’s scores. There are rules that govern the number
of bids a group of shills can submit during an auction.
We will examine some of the possible scenarios.
Table III illustrates a case where there are two bidders
and one of them is a shill. b1 must bid dnj/2e times to
win. The shill can submit at most bnj/2c bids, otherwise
they will win the auction (and fail as a shill).
Table IV illustrates a case where there are three bidders
and one of them is a shill. Consider the worst case
scenario for the shill in terms of the SS algorithm where
they must bid after every legitimate bid. This situation
results in the maximum β rating a bidder could possibly
get. As in the previous example, the shill can submit at
most bnj/2c bids. In reality, a shill will not normally need
to bid this many times, as there are would be situations
where two or more legitimate bidders might outbid an-
other bid before a shill has time to respond. However, we
must remember that is the worst case scenario (i.e., the
shill must bid after every legitimate bid). In contrast, the
best case scenario would be where the shill wouldn’t have
to bid at all, because the legitimate bidders had pushed
the price beyond the seller’s expected pay-off for shilling.
Given the worst case scenario with n legitimate bidders
and one shill, regardless of which bidder bids, collectively
the legitimate bidders must bid dnj/2e times to win. This
is shown in Table IV, where bidders b1 and b2 combined
must outbid the shill, s1.
In terms of colluding shills, increasing the number of
shills decreases the number of times each shill must bid
TABLE IV.
AUCTION WITH THREE BIDDERS - TWO BIDDERS (b1, b2), ONE
SHILL (s1)
nj b1 b2 s1 bid sequence b1 b2 s1
3 1 1 1 b1, s1, b2 dnj/2e bnj/2c
4 1 1 2 s1, b1, s1, b2 nj/2 nj/2
5 2 1 2 b1, s1, b2, s1, b1 dnj/2e bnj/2c
6 2 1 3 s1, b1, s1, b2, s1, b1 nj/2 nj/2
66 JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 2, NO. 10, DECEMBER 2007
© 2007 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
TABLE V.
AUCTION WITH THREE BIDDERS - ONE BIDDER (b1), TWO SHILLS
(s1, s2)
nj b1 s1 s2 bid sequence b1 s1 s2
4 2 1 1 s1, b1, s2, b1 nj/2 nj/2
5 3 1 1 b1, s1, b1, s2, b1 dnj/2e bnj/2c
6 3 2 1 s1, b1, s2, b1, s1, b1 nj/2 nj/2
7 4 2 1 b1, s1, b1, s2, b1, s1, b1 dnj/2e bnj/2c
8 4 2 2 b1, s1, b1, s2, b1, s1, b1, s2 nj/2 nj/2
(thereby decreasing an individual shill’s β rating). This
alleviates the worst case scenario for shilling. Given `′
shills (where `′ < `), the group can split the blame by di-
viding the number of bids submitted amongst themselves.
An individual shill can submit as little as bnj/2c/`′ bids
in an auction. This is shown in Table V with one bidder
and two shills.
In the case of maximum collusion (i.e., all bidders
are shills except for one, `′ = ` − 1), to win the
legitimate bidder is forced into submitting the most bids
for an individual in the auction (i.e., dnj/2e bids). If
the legitimate bidder wins, then his/her β rating will
be 0 for the auction (i.e., the SS algorithm does not
penalise winning bidders as winning is inconsistent with
a shill’s goals). However if the bidder does not win,
his/her β rating will be significantly higher than all the
other bidders (i.e., the shills), as a result of having to
compete with the shill bids. The later scenario becomes
common as more legitimate bidders are added. In this
situation a bidder’s γ rating (number of wins), will be
a significant factor in determining whether they really
are a shill. This example shows how colluding shills can
lower their individual shill scores while shifting attention
to innocent bidders.
The major question maximum collusion poses is, “how
do we detect and deter collusion among shill bidders
to ensure that the SS algorithm does not incriminate
a legitimate bidder?” We propose a solution to the
problem, which we refer to as the collusion graph.
- Collusion Graph -
The collusion graph indicates which bidders are likely
to be in collusion with each other. There are two different
forms of the collusion graph based on whether shills use
the alternating bid, or the alternating auction strategy.
Two new collusion ratings are introduced, η and θ,
that measures a bidder’s conduct in terms of collusive
behaviour. These ratings are not used in the calculation
of the shill score. Instead, the ratings supplement the shill
score, and serve to bring possible colluders to the attention
of the SS algorithm. We will discuss each rating in turn.
To detect colluding groups employing the alternating
bid strategy, bidders are represented as a graph G =
(V,E). V is the set of bidders, and E is an edge between
two bidders, indicating that they have both participated in
the same auction. The goal of the collusion graph is to
find a subset, C ⊂ V , which contains the bidders that are
most likely to be in collusion with each other.
A bidder initially has no edges connecting it to other
bidders (i.e., the set E is empty). Given two bidders,
vi, vj ∈ V , i 6= j, that participate in the same auction, an
edge ei,j is added to E that connects these two bidders
together. If bidders vi, vj participate in more than one
auction simultaneously, weights are added to the edge ei,j
to indicate the number of auctions they were present in
together.
The idea is that G will form a graph connecting
colluding bidders together. The higher the edge weighting
between two bidders, the greater the likelihood that the
two bidders are in collusion with each other. Figure 1
gives an example of a collusion graph. Here there are two
colluding bidders. In general, shills will have the most
number of edges (i.e., highest degree), and higher edge
weightings than legitimate bidders.
Figure 1. Example Collusion Graph
Given a node with degree k, each edge weight is
denoted as wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ `. The base collusion rating,
η′i, for a bidder i is calculated as the sum of the edge
weights incident to the node:
η′i =
k∑
j
wj
To calculate bidder i’s normalised collusion rating ηi,
we first need to find the maximum and minimum base
collusion ratings for the graph. These are denoted as ηmax
and ηmin respectively. The normalised collusion rating is
calculated as:
ηi =
η′i − ηmin
ηmax − ηmin
where 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1.
Colluding shills will have similar η collusion ratings.
This value is initially used to bring suspected colluders to
the attention of the SS algorithm, (but is not used in the
calculation of the shill score). Given a bidder with a high
collusion rating, we can then observe his/her γ, δ and ²
ratings, which will provide a strong indication whether
the bidder is engaging in collusive behaviour. Consistent
features for the group of shills will be their γ, δ and ²
ratings.
Figure 2. Potential Colluding Bidders
Figure 2 shows the previous example of the collusion
graph after the algorithm has been run. The bold nodes
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indicate the suspect bidders. The η ratings for these bid-
ders is 1. The next highest collusion rating for a bidder is
0.27, which is significantly lower than the three suspected
colluders. This example shows that the collusion graph
is able to immediately single out suspect bidders. These
bidders can then be further investigated based on their γ,
δ and ² ratings.
Figure 3. Example Collusion Graph
Figure 3 illustrates an example collusion graph with
two shills and three bidders. In this example there
are three auctions. Each bidder participates in ex-
actly one auction, whereas the shills participate in
all three auctions. The bidding sequences for each
auction are (s1, b1, s2, b1, s1, b1), (s2, b2, s1, b2) and
(s2, b3, s1, b3, s2, b3) respectively. The right side of Fig-
ure 3 shows that after the algorithm has been run, the
colluding shills strongly emerge as the most suspicious.
The collusion graph can be represented as an adjacency
matrix. Each entry in the matrix lists the edge weighting
for a pair of bidders. The collusion graph from Figure 3
gives the following adjacency matrix:
s1 s2 b1 b2 b3
s1 − 3 1 1 1
s2 3 − 1 1 1
b1 1 1 − 0 0
b2 1 1 0 − 0
b3 1 1 0 0 −
Base collusion ratings for each bidder can be obtained
by summing the entries in a bidder’s column.
Colluding shills using the alternating bid strategy will
have approximately the same α rating. The collusion
graph reflects this in the edge weights between bidders.
Colluding shills will also have participated with a similar
number of legitimate bidders. The collusion graph reflects
this by the degree of a bidder’s node. Colluding shills will
have approximately the same η rating.
However, in this form the η rating does not significantly
bind groups of bidders together. There are a lot of inno-
cent bidders that are incorporated into the collusion graph
by chance. These bidders will tend to have the lower η
ratings. Less significant collusion structures can be pruned
from the collusion graph, by using the observation that
colluding shills using the alternating bid strategy will have
approximately‘ the same β rating.
Given two suspect colluding bidders, we can further
compare them based on their β ratings. We refer to this
as a binding factor. The binding factor, φβi,j , gives bidders
i and j a value between 0 and 1, based on how similar
their β ratings are. A binding value of 1 indicates a strong
binding (high likelihood of collusion), whereas a binding
value of 0 indicates a weak binding.
Let βi and βj denote the β ratings for bidders i and j
respectively. If βi = βj , then the binding factor, φ
β
i,j , is
1. If this is not the case, then the binding factor is given
a decreasing value based on the percentage difference
between the two values. The binding factor for two
suspect bidders is calculated as:
φβi,j =
 1 if βi = βjβi/βj else if βi < βj
βj/βi otherwise
where 0 ≤ φβi,j ≤ 1.
Consider the maximum collusion scenario held over
m auctions. The legitimate bidder will have high α
and β ratings (i.e., high participation rate and number
of bids). The shills will have the same α ratings as
the bidder, but low β ratings. The collusion graph will
initially incriminate the legitimate bidder with the shill’s
group (due to the high participation rate). However, the
legitimate bidder will have a high β rating, as they must
submit more bids than the group of shills to win (i.e.,
dnj/2e bids in the extreme scenario).
In this case, the binding factor, φβi,j can be used to
compare the bidder to any of the shills. φβi,j will be low
for the bidder, (i.e., s/he does not bind to any of the
shills). Whereas φβi,j will be high for the colluding group.
Therefore φβi,j serves to exonerate the legitimate bidder.
Furthermore, if the bidder has actually managed to win
any auctions, his/her γ rating will be low and thus provide
a strong indication of integrity.
In order to determine which bidders are the most likely
to be in collusion, a collusion score (denoted as CSη) is
used. CSη combines the η collusion rating, binding factor
and other aspects of the shill score ratings, to form an
index which measures the extent of collusive behaviour a
bidder exhibits in terms of the alternating bid strategy.
The set of bidders B, is partitioned into disjoint sets of
suspected colluding bidders. This is done based on how
similar bidders’ η ratings are to other bidders. Let C =
{C1, C2, ..., Ck} denote the set of all sets of suspicious
bidders. Initially, the first bidder, i is assigned to C1.
Bidder j (i 6= j) is added to C1 if ηi = ηj±λ, where λ is
an error factor. This process is repeated for all remaining
bidders until every bidder is assigned to a set in C. A
bidder that is not suspicious will be assigned to a singleton
set (i.e., s/he is the only bidder in the set). Note that this
is probably not the ‘best’ method for grouping bidders,
as some bidders whose η ratings fall within the range
of ηi ± λ might miss out on being grouped with more
similar bidders later in the process (i.e., those with a closer
η rating). A more optimal grouping method remains the
focus of future work.
A further problem with this approach to grouping is
that two bidders may have similar η ratings, but have not
actually participated in any auctions together. In this case,
grouping the two bidders together would be incorrect
as the grouping is in conflict with what behaviour the
collusion graph is trying to highlight. Instead, when two
bidders are checked for similarity with their η ratings,
a secondary check is then performed to see whether they
have actually participated in any auctions together. If they
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have, they are placed in the same group, otherwise they
are placed in separate groups.
Once two (or more) bidders have been singled out
based on the similarity of their collusion ratings, CSη
checks the bidder’s binding ratings. φβσ is the average
binding factor for a bidder with the other suspect col-
luding group members. For a singleton set φβσ = 0. A
potential shill will have a low win rate, high bid rate,
and low bid increment. If ηi > 0.5, CSη is calculated as
the average of the bidder’s γ, δ, ² and η ratings, and the
average binding factor φβσ . A bidder with a shill score of
zero is excluded. Bidder i’s CSη is calculated as:
CSηi =
ω1α+ ω2γ + ω3δ + ω4²+ ω5ζ + ω6η + ω7φ
β
σ
ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6 + ω7
× 10
where 0 ≤ CSη ≤ 10, and ωi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, is the weight
associated with each rating.
The ζ rating is included in calculating CSη , however,
there are several points to note about its use. For an
individual auction, the shill that bids first will have a
higher ζ rating than the later shills. As a result, over m
auctions, each shill must also alternate at bidding first.
This ensures that over time each of the group members
will have a similar ζ rating. A binding factor could be
used for two suspect bidders based on their ζ ratings.
However, this is not an overly reliable collusion indicator.
Nevertheless, the ζ rating still provides some useful
information. For a shill bidder engaging in the alternating
bid strategy, the ζ rating will range from medium to high.
Empirical evidence suggests that ζ = 0.75 on average for
the alternating auction strategy. In a group of bidders with
similar γ, δ and ² ratings, the ζ rating can often be the
determining factor that incriminates a shill bidder.
B. Alternating Auction Strategy
The alternating auction strategy is optimal for a
colluding group, if the number of shills, `′, is equal to
the number of auctions held, m. In the shill case from
Section I, there were 1,100 auctions, however, the shills
only had 40 aliases. In this case, given m auctions, the
group can evenly reduce its member’s α ratings if each
shill participates in m/`′ auctions. However, there is a
certain amount of effort required to create new aliases
and/or recruit new shills. This reduces this strategy’s
effectiveness, especially when m is large.
- Dual Collusion Graph -
The alternating auction strategy requires a different
approach. The idea is to look for bidders that have never
competed against each other in an auction. In this situa-
tion, the “dual” of the collusion graph is used. In the dual
collusion graph, the nodes that have edges in the regular
graph are removed, and edges are added between nodes
that did not have edges in the regular graph. Edge weights
from the regular graph have no meaning, as either two
bidders have participated in at least one auction together,
or they haven’t. All edge weights from the regular graph
are discarded. All edges in the dual graph have a weight
of 1.
Figure 4. Example Dual Collusion Graph
Figure 4 shows an example of the dual collusion
graph involving two bidders and two shills. There are
two auctions. The shills participate in one auction each,
whereas the regular bidders participate in both auctions.
The bidding sequences for each auction are (s1, b1, s1, b2)
and (s2, b1, s2, b2) respectively. The adjacency matrix for
this collusion graph is:
s1 s2 b1 b2
s1 − 0 1 1
s2 0 − 1 1
b1 1 1 − 2
b2 1 1 2 −
The dual collusion graph shows an association between
s1 and s2. The adjacency matrix for the dual collusion
graph is:
s1 s2 b1 b2
s1 − 1 0 0
s2 1 − 0 0
b1 0 0 − 0
b2 0 0 0 −
θ is a collusion rating that indicates whether a bidder
may be engaging in the alternating auction strategy. This
is obtained from the dual collusion graph in a similar
manner to the η rating. Given a node with degree k, each
edge weight is denoted as wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ `. The base
collusion rating, θ′i, for a bidder i is calculated as the
sum of the edge weights for the node’s degree:
θ′i =
k∑
j
wj
To calculate a bidder’s normalised collusion θ rating
we first need to find the maximum and minimum base
collusion ratings for the graph. These are denoted as θmax
and θmin respectively. The normalised collusion rating is
calculated as:
θi =
θ′i − θmin
θmax − θmin
where 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1.
Similar to the argument for the alternating bid strategy,
it is in the group’s best interest to evenly take turns at
participating in each auction to collectively keep their
α ratings low. Given two suspect colluding bidders, we
can further compare them based on their α ratings as
they should have very similar values (assuming that they
have evenly alternated in their participation). The binding
factor, φαi,j , gives bidders i and j a value between 0 and
1, based on how similar their α ratings are. A binding
value of 1 indicates a strong binding (high likelihood of
collusion), whereas a binding value of 0 indicates a weak
binding.
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TABLE VI.
SHILL SCORE AND COLLUSION BEHAVIOUR PROFILES
Rating Single Shill Alternating Bid Alternating Auction Hybrid
α participation rate high high low low-medium
β bid rate high low high low-medium
γ loss rate high high high high
δ bid frequency high high high high
² size of bid high high high high
ζ early participation high medium high medium-high
η alternating bid high medium-high
θ alternating auction high low-medium
φβσ binding factor high medium-high
φασ binding factor high medium-high
Let αi and αj denote the α ratings for bidders i and j
respectively. If αi = αj , then the binding factor, φαi,j , is
1. If this is not the case, then the binding factor is given
a decreasing value based on the percentage difference
between the two values. The binding factor for two
suspect bidders is calculated as:
φαi,j =
 1 if αi = αjαi/αj else if αi < αj
αj/αi otherwise
where 0 ≤ φαi,j ≤ 1.
In order to determine which bidders are the most likely
to be in collusion, a collusion score (denoted as CSθ) is
used. CSθ combines the θ collusion rating, binding factor
and other aspects of the shill score ratings, to form an
index which measures the extent of collusive behaviour a
bidder exhibits in terms of the alternating auction strategy.
The set of bidders B, is partitioned into disjoint sets
of suspected colluding bidders. This is done in a similar
manner as the alternating bid strategy. Once two (or more)
bidders have been singled out based on the similarity of
their collusion ratings, CSθ checks the bidder’s binding
ratings. φασ is the average binding factor for a bidder
with the other suspect colluding group members. For a
singleton set φασ = 0. A potential shill will have a high
bid rate, low bid increment, and generally commences
bidding early in an auction. If θi > 0.5, CSθ is calculated
as the average of the bidder’s δ, ², ζ, and θ ratings, and
the average binding factor φασ . Again, a bidder with a shill
score of zero is excluded. Bidder i’s CSθ is calculated
as:
CSθi =
ω1β + ω2γ + ω3δ + ω4²+ ω5ζ + ω6θ + ω7φ
α
σ
ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6 + ω7
× 10
where 0 ≤ CSθ ≤ 10, and ωi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, is the weight
associated with each rating.
Note that the γ rating is excluded as it is a function of
the number of auctions participated in, versus the number
of winnings. This is unreliable if the colluding group has
engaged in an alternating auction strategy, as the α rating
will be low, thus affecting the γ rating. The alternating
auction strategy has no ramifications for the ζ rating (i.e.,
the time a bidder commences bidding). That is, for each
auction the shill will behave in a typical shill-like manner
(i.e., bidding early). This means that the ζ rating is still
indicative of a shill.
C. Hybrid Strategy
A hybrid strategy combines both the alternating bid and
alternating auction strategies. By doing so, the colluding
group can lower each member’s α and β ratings. The
optimal hybrid strategy requires the coalition to choose(
`′
p
)
= m, where `′ is the total number of shills, p is the
number of shills to be used each auction, and m is the
total number of auctions.
Table VI shows the shill score ratings for each shilling
strategy. Of particular interest here is the comparison
between a single shill’s profile and a group of colluding
shills using a hybrid strategy. At most the group can only
minimally influence their shill scores. However, if they do
so they will be detected by the collusion graph. The only
way to avoid detection is for one of the group members to
have a shill score higher than the others (thus conforming
to the profile of a single shill).
A hybrid strategy can be detected using a combination
of the η and θ ratings. The ideal situation for the group
is to keep the α and β ratings even for all colluders.
However, the binding factors φβi,j and φ
α
i,j , prevent the
group from evenly distributing their work. As doing so
will result in the colluding group having high binding
factors. This forces some shills to bid more, and/or
participate in more auctions than other shills (thus raising
their individual α and β ratings). An extreme hybrid
strategy would entail using each shill once only. However,
there are practical limitations on doing this.
To detect shills employing a hybrid strategy, we in-
troduce a third collusion score (denoted as CSh). CSh
examines the η ratings, and the binding factors for bidders
that fit the hybrid profile shown in Table VI. θ is not used,
as this value is typically low for the hybrid strategy. The
δ and ² ratings will still be indicative of a shill bidder.
However the α, β and γ ratings can not be relied on.
At best the hybrid strategy only achieves a moderate
reduction in the group’s ζ ratings. Again, a bidder with
a shill score of zero is excluded. Bidder i’s CSh is
calculated as:
CShi =
ω1γ + ω2δ + ω3²+ ω4ζ + ω5η + ω6φ
β
σ + ω7φ
α
σ
ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6 + ω7
×10
where 0 ≤ CSh ≤ 10, and ωi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, is the weight
associated with each rating.
Partitioning the set of bidders B, into disjoint sets of
suspected colluding bidders is a much more difficult task
with the hybrid strategy. Let Groupη and Groupθ denote
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particular groupings for the η and θ ratings respectively.
One possible approach is as follows: If bidders i and
j (where i 6= j) both belong to Groupη and also to
Groupθ, then these two particular bidders can be grouped
together under the hybrid strategy. However, empirical
evidence shows that this is often not the case, and bidders
that belong to the same Groupη often do not belong to
the same Groupθ. There is some evidence showing that
several bidders that belong to Groupη do in fact map
to several bidders in group Groupθ who are shills (but
weren’t originally in Groupη). In future work we hope
to some how use this information to further develop an
accurate grouping method for the hybrid strategy.
D. Applying the SS Algorithm
In this section we briefly outline how the SS Algorithm
can be applied to aid in detecting colluding shill bidders.
Consider first the alternating bid strategy. In this ap-
proach we treat all member shills as one shill and then
apply the SS algorithm to it. Consider the following
bidding sequence with two shills (s1, s2), and four bidders
(b1, b2, b3, b4):
s1, b1, s2, b2, s1, b3, s2, b4
Since s1 and s2 have a suspicious bidding pattern, these
two bidders are considered as being the same bidder
which is denoted as ss. The bidding sequence then
becomes:
ss, b1, ss, b2, ss, b3, ss, b4
From here the SS algorithm can be run on this bidding
sequence to determine whether the group ss exhibits
characteristic shill bidding behaviour.
However, there are problems with such a naive ap-
proach. Firstly, how do you determine which bidders are
suspicious? The following instance is easy:
s1, b1, s2, b2, s1, b3, s2, b4
But what if the shill bidding sequence doesn’t exactly
match this? That is, the shill was outbid before s/he had
time to respond, or if the shills have stopped bidding (i.e.,
the shill target price has been reached, or it is too close to
the auction’s end)? Consider the following bid sequence
with four shill bidders:
s1, b1, s2, b2, b1, s1, b2, b4
In this case the colluding shills have not made every
second bid, therefore combining them into a single group
is difficult. The approach simply cannot be used by se-
lecting the first bidder and then grouping them with every
second bidder. Furthermore, the grouping task becomes
more difficult when the number of colluding shills is large.
Consider the following bid sequence:
s1, b1, s2, b2, s3, b3, s4, b4
Here each shill has only bid once. This gives the appear-
ance of seemingly innocent behaviour.
This approach does have merit when combined with
the alternating bidding collusion rating CSη . CSη can
single out a suspect group and then the SS algorithm is
used on the entire group.
This approach can also be applied to the alternate
auction strategy. Consider the following bidding
sequences for auctions a1, a2, a3, a4:
a1 − s1, b1, s1, b2, s1, b1, s1, b3
a2 − s2, b1, s2, b2, s2, b2, s2, b3
a3 − s1, b1, s1, b2, s1, b2
a4 − s2, b1, s2, b2, s2, b3, s2, b3, s2, b2
By combining the identified group members together
as if they were a single bidder ss, the bidding sequence
becomes:
a1 − ss, b1, ss, b2, ss, b1, ss, b3
a2 − ss, b1, ss, b2, ss, b2, ss, b3
a3 − ss, b1, ss, b2, ss, b2
a4 − ss, b1, ss, b2, ss, b3, ss, b3, ss, b2
As in the alternating bid strategy, the alternating auction
collusion score CSθ, can be used as the basis for the
grouping.
V. PERFORMANCE
This section describes how the collusion algorithm
performs on simulated auction data generated using au-
tonomous bidding agents. The Research Auction Server
(RAS) at James Cook University is an online auction
server used for conducting research into privacy and secu-
rity issues in online auctions (see [6]). The SS algorithm
and collusion graph have been implemented on and tested
using RAS. Elements of the experimental setup include:
Zero Intelligence (ZI) Agent - An agent designed to
simulate an ordinary bidder in an auction. It is assigned a
random amount, which it tries to submit as a proxy bid at
a random time throughout the auction. The agent’s price
is generated randomly according to a uniform distribution.
Simple Shill Bidding Agent - An agent designed to
insert fake bids into the auction in order to inflate the
price for the seller. The agent ceases bidding when the
desired profit from shilling has been attained, or in the
case that it is too risky to continue bidding (e.g., during
slow bidding, or near the auction’s end). (See [7] for
implementation specific details regarding the simple shill
agent.) In general, the risky the shill agent, the more
profit it an attain, but the higher the likelihood that it will
win the auction. A risky shill agent will display more
characteristics that will increase its shill score than a risk
adverse shill.
Auction - A software simulated auction. The auction
has a start and end time. The bidding agents can submit
bids during this time, where the auction outcome depends
on the agents’ actions. All auctions are English auctions
with proxy bidding.
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Figure 5. Shill Scores for Simulated Auctions with Differing Collusion Strategies
Figure 6. Example collusion scores for the alternating bid strategy
Four main test types were conducted. Each test
consisted of ten auctions with 20 ZI bidders. All ZI
bidders were given the opportunity to participate in
any auction. However not all ZI agents can participate
in every auction. This is because a ZI agent is unable
to participate in a particular auction if the current bid
exceeds its proxy bid at the stage in the auction when it
is first permitted to bid. The number of shills used varied
with the type of test being conducted. The shill agent’s
target price was set to $6.50 and programmed to bid in a
moderately risk-adverse manner (see [7]). All tests were
repeated, and standard results are given.
Claim 1 Colluding shills were able to reduce their
collective shill score in relation to a single shill. As
expected, the colluding shills have lower α and β
ratings than a single shill, and as a result lower shill
scores. Figure 5 A shows a series of auctions without
shilling. The single shill’s shill score was 9 (see Figure 5
B), whereas five colluding shills using the alternating
bid strategy managed to reduce their shill scores to
8 (see Figure 5 C). Five colluding shills employing
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the alternating auction strategy achieved shill scores
around 5 (see Figure 5 D). This clearly shows that the
alternating auction strategy is more effective against
the SS algorithm. However, as previously stated, the
alternating auction strategy is more expensive in terms
of the number of shills required, when compared to
other strategies. Five colluding shills employing a hybrid
strategy achieved a shill scores in the range of 5 to 6
(see Figure 5 E). In general, the larger the colluding
group (relative to the number of legitimate bidders), the
lower the group’s shill scores.
Claim 2 The collusion graph accurately identified bidders
that engaged in the alternating bid strategy. This test
involved ten colluding shills employing the alternating
bid strategy. Figure 6 graphically shows each bidder’s
collusion score. The ten shills consequently have the
highest ratings. Figure 6’s bottom section shows the
shill statistics for the top ten rating bidders in terms of
collusion score. The shills were divided into three distinct
groups, which none of the regular bidders were members.
The suspicious group members substantially bind with φβσ
ranging between 0.77 and 0.95. It is interesting to note
that all the legitimate bidders scored 0 (for CSη). Results
were consistent when this test was repeated.
Weightings for CSη were set based on empirical ob-
servation. In this example the weights are ω1 = 1 (α),
ω2 = 3 (γ), ω3 = 2 (δ), ω4 = 2 (²), ω5 = 5 (ζ),
ω6 = 5 (η) and ω7 = 3 (φασ ). While α (number of
auctions participated in) is a significant factor, it was given
a lower rating for this particular test. This was due to the
large number of shills compared to the small number of
auctions. Even though every shill had the opportunity to
participate in each auction, not every shill did as ten shill
bids where not always needed (i.e., ten being the number
of shills). As a result, the α rating for each shill was not
significantly high.
The γ rating (number of winnings) was given an
increased weighting, as even though each shill may not
have got the chance to participate in every auction, for the
auctions they did participate in, they will have lost. ² and δ
are still strongly indicative of shill bidding behaviour (i.e.,
fast bidding by small bid increments), and were weighted
appropriately.
The ζ rating (time commenced bidding) was given a
higher weighting. Even though ζ will be reduced for
the alternating bidding strategy (as shills alternate and
the commencement time will average out), this was a
significant factor that exonerated legitimate bidders with
high δ and ² ratings from shills. (That is legitimate bidders
who bid in few auctions, and when they did bid it was
quickly and by a small amount, which resulted in them
attaining high δ and ² ratings.)
As can be seen from the results, shills engaging in
the alternating bidding strategy rate extremely high in
terms of the η rating. As such, the η rating was also
given a significant weighting. The binding factor φασ , also
performed strongly for the shills, but is less significant
than the η rating for determining collusive behaviour.
Since the grouping was not accurate (i.e., the shills
were split between several groups), we individually
singled out the shills and run the SS algorithm on the
group as a whole. The shill score for the group (when run
over a series of tests) was consistent with the results of
Claim 1 for a single shill. That is, the group’s collective
shill score over a series of tests ranged between 8 and 10.
Claim 3 The dual collusion graph highlighted bidders
that exhibited behaviour indicative of the alternating
auction strategy. This test used ten colluding shills,
where each shill participated exclusively in one of the
ten auctions. Figure 7 graphically shows each bidder’s
collusion score. In this example, 15 bidders attain a
collusion score greater than 0. Out of these bidders, 11
rate higher than 7. The shills had the top ten highest
consecutive ratings. Figure 7’s bottom section shows the
shill statistics for all bidders in terms of the collusion
score. The shills were allocated to two groups. However,
several legitimate bidders were also caught up in some of
these groups. This illustrates that detecting shills is not an
exact science. Innocent bidders can be falsely associated
with a colluding group. Likewise a shill might miss out
on being assigned to a suspect group, hence avoiding
detection. Suspicious group members bind strongly with
φασ ranging between 0.88 and 1.
Weightings for CSθ were set based on empirical ob-
servation. In this example the weights are ω1 = 2 (β),
ω2 = 1 (γ), ω3 = 4 (δ), ω4 = 5 (²), ω5 = 9 (ζ),
ω6 = 6 (θ) and ω7 = 5 (φβσ). The β ratings for this
test weren’t overly high due to the shill agents being
relatively risk adverse. ω1 can be increased with riskier
shills. ω2 was given the lowest weighting due to the
nature of the γ rating. The γ rating is dependent on the
number of auctions participated in proportional to the
number of winnings. In this example, each shill only
participated in one auction each, and as such each γ
rating never exceeded 0.50. ω2 can be increased with a
larger number of auctions. δ and ² are still indicative of
shill behaviour (regardless of the strategy employed) and
were weighted appropriately. The ζ rating was given a
the highest weighting (ω5 = 9) as this is a truly defining
characteristic that separates a legitimate bidder who has
participated in only one auction (and lost) that has high
δ and ² ratings. θ and φβσ are rated relatively high to pull
out bidders that display collusive behaviour indicative of
the alternating auction strategy
Similar to the alternating bidding strategy, the
grouping was not accurate (i.e., the shills were split
between several groups). Again we individually singled
out the shills and run the SS algorithm on the group
as a whole. The shill score for the group (when run
over a series of tests) was consistent with the results of
Claim 1 for a single shill. That is, the group’s collective
shill score over a series of tests ranged between 8 and 10.
Claim 4 The collusion score was able to successfully
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Figure 7. Example collusion scores for the alternating auction strategy
single out suspect bidders employing a hybrid strategy. To
validate this claim, various tests were conducted involving
numerous hybrid strategies. For hybrid strategies that
favoured either extreme (i.e., alternating bid or alternating
auction) rated highly in the respective collusion scores.
Figure 8 shows the shill and collusion scores for a hybrid
strategy using
(
5
2
)
combinations of shills over 10 auctions.
The five shills were the highest rating in terms of CSh.
However, similar to CSθ, some innocent bidders are
incorrectly grouped with the shills.
Weightings for CSh were set based on empirical obser-
vation. In this example the weights are ω1 = 2, ω2 = 5,
ω3 = 5, ω4 = 10, ω5 = 1, ω6 = 1 and ω7 = 1. The
γ rating was given a relatively low weighting due to the
small number of auctions in the test. The δ and ² ratings
were given increased weightings to single out any bidders
that bid quickly and by small amounts. The ζ rating was
given an extremely high weighting because tests showed
that shills employing a hybrid strategy always rated highly
in this area (i.e., bid early). The η rating and binding
factors were given a low rating as these are less reliable
indicators due to problems with groupings.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes methods for detecting colluding
shill bidders. We have identified three main strategies a
colluding group of shills can engage in to collectively
reduce their individual shill scores. Colluding shills can
be detected by examining a group of bidders for typical
collusive behaviour in terms of the identified strategies.
We introduce the collusion graph, which indicates rela-
tionships between groups of bidders that exhibit collusive
behaviour in the form of the alternating bid strategy.
The dual collusion graph is used to indicate relationships
between groups of bidders that exhibit collusive behaviour
in the form of the alternating auction strategy. Once
a suspicious group is discovered, they are then further
examined using a binding factor that indicates how similar
the group members are based on aspects of their shill
score ratings (i.e., α, β, γ, δ, ² and ζ). The collusion
score combines all of these ratings and gives each bidder
a score based on the likelihood that they are engaging in
collusive shilling behaviour.
The ability of the collusion score to detect collusive
shill bidding was tested on simulated auction data. Ex-
perimental results indicate that colluding shills are able to
decrease their shill scores, compared to a single shill. The
collusion algorithm was able to successfully identify shills
that engaged in the alternating bid strategy. The algorithm
highlighted major colluding groups using the alternating
auction strategy. When shills used a hybrid strategy, the
algorithm partitioned potential colluding groups. Some
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Figure 8. Example collusion scores and shill information for the hybrid strategy
innocent bidders may be incriminated and some shills
may not be detected. However, this work forms the
basis for more sophisticated shill detection techniques
that minimise the extent of false incrimination and non-
detection. Other future work involves examining the ef-
fects of multiple seller collusion on shill detection, and
using data mining techniques to improve upon existing
work conducted.
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